
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COUNTRY AIRSPACE REPORT


IRAQ

Generated 2026-11-24 19:13 UTC · Report ID SAMPLE · created for sample@aerisk.example · SafeConflictZone ARI



INTOLERABLE

Level of risk



Confidence **87%** · +0 vs previous

Risk index **5A** · **intolerable** (matrix: conclusion page)

Bottom line

3 state warnings are currently active for Iraq (EASA, France, USA); 2 of them contain a prohibition or an avoid-entry instruction. GNSS interference: FIR ORBB (Baghdad) ranks #6 in EASA's 7-day list, spoofing reported. Open sources list 1 surface-to-air system type able to reach cruise altitude (Pantsir-S1).

Recommendation. Reroute recommended; avoid the FIR where possible.

#	Recommended actions	Basis
1	**Reroute around the FIR.** Fly through it only if no alternative exists, with a written risk assessment and the approvals of the authority and the operator.	Level intolerable (score 70-84); 2 active prohibition / avoid-entry warnings
2	**Do not rely on altitude for protection.** 1 listed surface-to-air system type can engage above cruise level (up to about FL490, Pantsir-S1). Positions of batteries are unknown: keep the route clear of the conflict area, not just high above it.	Open-source catalogue; ceilings are approximate maxima
3	**Expect GNSS jamming and spoofing in FIR ORBB.** Brief the crew, keep a conventional navigation fallback ready (VOR/DME, inertial), cross-check position, and report interference to ATC.	EASA GNSS interference ranking: #6; spoofing reported
4	**Add contingency fuel and alternates** for a diversion around the FIR; choose alternates outside the affected area and check ETOPS and hazard areas on the alternate route.	Reroute at short notice must not depend on the fuel left
5	**Reroute immediately if:** a new prohibition or avoid-entry NOTAM appears; a missile or drone attack on an aircraft or airport in the FIR is reported; GNSS spoofing is reported on your route; ATC contact is lost. **Re-check** NOTAMs, bulletins and this report within 24 hours before departure.	Operator decision rules; re-run the report before each flight

Actions are built from this report's own data. The decision rests with the operator's responsible person and the competent authority.

How to read the level

ACCEPTABLE score 0-24	TOLERABLE score 25-69	INTOLERABLE score 70-100
No further action beyond normal monitoring.	Acceptable only with mitigation; brief crews, prepare alternates.	Not acceptable as is: reroute, close or do not plan.

Wording follows ICAO Doc 9859 and Doc 10084 risk tolerability. The score 0-100 is the SafeConflictZone Airspace Risk Index, a screening aid built from official warnings, conflict, air defence, NOTAMs and GNSS interference. The index beside it (e.g. 5A) is read from the ICAO 5x5 matrix: probability 1-5 by severity A-E; see section 10. Confidence shows how much data stands behind the score.


Informational service. Not a substitute for official NOTAMs, AIPs or regulator bulletins; the decision to close, avoid or operate rests with the responsible person/regulator. Index values marked DEMO are illustrative, not real assessments. Always check current NOTAMs.

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3	2	#6	1
active state warnings	prohibit / avoid-entry	GNSS interference rank (EASA)	SAM types reaching cruise level

01 Airspace restrictions and official warnings

Timeline of state warnings (last 24 months). ■ prohibition / avoid entry ■ caution / advisory ■ expired or withdrawn



Issued	Issuer / ref	Measure*	Content	Valid to
2026-07-08	EASA (CZIB) CZIB nid 143862 · CZIB	L2 recommended not to enter FIR Baghdad (ORBB)	Airspace of Iraq. EASA recommendation: Not operate within the airspace of Iraq, FIR Baghdad (ORBB), at all altitudes and flight levels; Closely monitor airspace developments in the region and follow all available aeronautical publications, in particular airspace closures or restrictions issued by State authorities, alongside available guidance or direction f…	2027-01-31
2025-08-28	France (DGAC) AIC France A 019/26 s.3.2 · AIC	L2 recommended not to enter ORBB FIR; FL320	From 28/08/2025 and until further notice, pilots in command of aircraft performing air services mentioned in paragraph 1.1 are requested: - Not to penetrate into the airspace of Iraq (ORBB FIR (BAGDAD)), except for routes M860 (between GADSI and NINVA), M688, L602 (between TASMI and ALPET) and L718 (between ALPET and KABAN) on which a flight level above or e…	ongoing
2024-10-16	USA (FAA) KICZ A0013/24 · NOTAM	L3 prohibition / strong rec.	Federal Aviation Administration KICZ A0013/24 - SECURITY..UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PROHIBITION AGAINST CERTAIN FLIGHTS IN THE BAGHDAD FLIGHT INFORMATION REGION (FIR) (ORBB).	ongoing

* Measure level uses the wording scale of ICAO Doc 10084 (L1 information/caution, L2 recommended not to enter, L3 prohibition or strong recommendation). It is derived automatically from the warning text we hold; n/d = not determinable from that text. Check the original document before relying on it.

02 Latest NOTAMs

NOTAM	Location	Valid / status	Type / text
A0403/26	ORBB	05 Oct 26 05:00Z – 05 Jan 27 04:59Z active	NOTAM
A0456/26	ORNI	26 Nov 26 05:00Z – 10 Dec 26 04:59Z active	NOTAM
A0457/26	ORER	26 Nov 26 05:00Z – 10 Dec 26 04:59Z active	NOTAM
A0455/26	ORBB	26 Nov 26 05:00Z – 10 Dec 26 04:59Z active	NOTAM
A0512/26	ORBI	24 Nov 26 15:45Z – 24 Nov 26 18:00Z expired	NOTAM
A0506/26	ORBI	24 Nov 26 12:00Z – 24 Nov 26 18:00Z expired	NOTAM

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NOTAM	Location	Valid / status	Type / text
A0505/26	ORMM	23 Nov 26 18:50Z – 29 Nov 26 19:00Z active	NOTAM
A0501/26	ORKK	17 Nov 26 18:05Z – 01 Jan 27 04:59Z active	NOTAM

The most recent NOTAMs held for this country: active risk-relevant ones first, then the latest others (expired ones are marked). Where a source's terms do not allow republishing the text, only type, place and validity are listed: read the full NOTAM in the official AIS. Coverage differs by country and there is no global live feed.

03 Air traffic situation

Follow the link and study the situation yourself: Iraq on Flightradar24 (the map opens centred on 33.2°N 43.7°E).

What to look for.


- Empty or thin main airways over the country compared with its neighbours: carriers may already be avoiding it.
- Aircraft bunching, holding or turning away along the border, and detours around the FIR.
- Which airlines still fly there and at what altitude: use the filters (altitude, airline, aircraft type).

Read what you see together with the official warnings and NOTAMs in this report. An empty sky can mean closed airspace, or only that there are few receivers nearby.

The link opens an external site. Its data, coverage and terms are its own and are not part of this report.

04 Conflict history and recent developments

Reported fatalities per month, 2020–2024 (UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset v25.1): **3,876** in total. History enters the index as a secondary factor.



Source: UCDP GED (Uppsala Conflict Data Program); data ends December 2024. Counts are event-based minimums.

Recent coverage: no security- or airspace-related items were found in the monitored open feeds in the last 45 days (general news is deliberately not shown).

05 Navigation interference (GNSS)

FIR	Name	7-day rank	30-day rank	Spoofing reported
ORBB	Baghdad	#6 of 40	#10 of 48	yes

Source: EASA GNSS interference ranking from ADS-B data and reports (as of 2026-11-12); ranks FIRs over the last 7/30 days.

06 Air-defence environment (draft factor)

Open-source lists name **2** surface-to-air system types in service, **1** with an engagement ceiling above cruise level. Indicative capability score **45**/100. A capable system is a risk only together with hostile intent and active military use, so it is combined with the conflict context in the index.



System	Class	Max range	Ceiling	Reaches cruise
Pantsir-S1	SR	20 km	15 km	yes
FIM-92 Stinger (MANPADS)	MANPADS	8 km	3.8 km	no

Country-level inventory from open sources (Wikipedia operator lists, CC BY-SA); ranges and ceilings are approximate maxima for the best-known variant and are unverified. Positions of individual batteries are not collected. Absence from the list does not mean absence of capability.

Informational service. Not a substitute for official NOTAMs, AIPs or regulator bulletins; the decision to close, avoid or operate rests with the responsible person/regulator. Index values marked DEMO are illustrative, not real assessments. Always check current NOTAMs.

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Confirmed incidents involving air defences in this country (dated, with sources; unconfirmed claims are excluded)

Date	Actor	Target / outcome	Confirmed by
2003-11-22	unidentified armed group (insurgents reported) surface-to-air missile (type not confirmed)	DHL/EAT Airbus A300-200F OO-DLL damaged landed	credible media https://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/11/25

safeconflictzone SAMPLE

Informational service. Not a substitute for official NOTAMs, AIPs or regulator bulletins; the decision to close, avoid or operate rests with the responsible person/regulator. Index values marked DEMO are illustrative, not real assessments. Always check current NOTAMs.

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07 Threats by weapon type

Levels for 12 weapon types, grouped by the altitude band where they matter for civil aircraft. **5 of 12** types have data for this country, updated 2026-11-24. Country confidence 87%.

Altitude band	Weapon type	Level	Index*	Basis
Above FL320	Missiles	– No data	–	no signal held (not the same as Low)
	Surface-to-air missiles	M Medium	**3A** intolerable	confirmed incident 2003-11-22 (civil_cargo, older than 3y)
	Space launches / re-entry	– No data	–	no signal held (not the same as Low)
FL100–FL320	Anti-aircraft guns	– No data	–	no signal held (not the same as Low)
	Shoulder-fired missiles (MANPADS)	L Low	**2A** tolerable	MANPADS in inventory
	Military airspace violations	– No data	–	no signal held (not the same as Low)
All altitudes	Drones / UAS	– No data	–	no signal held (not the same as Low)
	Cyberattacks	– No data	–	no signal held (not the same as Low)
	Nuclear threat	– No data	–	no signal held (not the same as Low)
	GPS/GNSS jamming & spoofing	H High	**5C** intolerable	EASA GNSS ranking (ORBB 30d#10, ORBB 7d#6) + spoofing reported
Below FL100	Rockets / RPG / mortars / ATGM	M Medium	**3B** tolerable	media-derived event data (GDELT) 30d: 39 armed-violence events (ground fighting)
	Small arms fire	M Medium	**3C** tolerable	media-derived event data (GDELT) 30d: 39 armed-violence events (ground fighting)

High = recent use against aviation; Medium = use against other targets, an official warning naming the weapon, or capability in an active conflict; Low = no history. 'No data' means we hold no signal for this type, not that the threat is absent. Method summary is available to customers on request. * Index = probability (1-5) x severity (A-E) before mitigation, proposed by fixed rules (see the conclusion section); a proposal for the responsible person, not a decision.

08 Operational guidance

Approvals. Plan only with explicit approvals and a documented risk assessment; identify alternates outside the affected FIR.

Aviation safety. Avoid the FIR where possible; if unavoidable, stay at/above the altitudes stated in current NOTAMs and follow state advisories strictly.

Aviation security. Operate to the country only with a security plan and a contingency for evacuation/diversion.

Guidance blocks are generic by risk level; country-specific analysis is in the sections above.

09 Risk mitigation measures (reference register)

Standard measures for operations over or near conflict zones, selected for risk level **Intolerable** and for signals recorded in this country (gnss, sam). They are listed by who acts; the decision on which to apply rests with the responsible person.

Operator / flight planning

- Check current NOTAMs, AIPs and regulator bulletins on the planned route, destination and alternates before every flight. [E-II a)]
- Follow instructions of the authorities of the State of the operator and of the State managing the airspace; ask them when in doubt. [E-II a) 1)]
- Review open-source information on the route, destinations, alternates and the States overflown, and cross-check it against more than one source. [E-II a) 2)]
- Keep the operator's risk assessment current: repeat it whenever the situation changes materially, not only on a fixed schedule. [Ch.4 4.1.3]
- Plan alternative routes in advance for unplanned events and select alternates outside the affected area (also check ETOPS and hazard areas). [E-II a) 3)]
- Brief flight crews on the current threat picture and on the contingency plan; give them real-time information so they can decide on diversion. [E-II c)]
- Agree a communication channel with the responsible authority and, where possible, with partner operators for regular and emergency information exchange. [E-II d)]
- Avoid the affected airspace where an alternative exists. Operate in it only if effective mitigation is confident and the residual risk stays within the operator's accepted tolerance. [Ch.4 4.8.3]
- Consider temporarily routing around the affected airspace with an adequate geographic margin until the assessment is updated (precautionary approach). [Ch.5 5.3.1]

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- After choosing mitigation, assess the new flight-safety risks it creates (denser traffic on other routes, extra fuel, reduced payload). [Ch.4 4.8.4]
- Run safety and security exercises on realistic scenarios and train crews regularly. [E-II f)]

Flight crew and flight operations

- Take note of all applicable NOTAMs and other aeronautical publications for the planned route during flight preparation. [E-I a)]
- Carry extra fuel to be ready for changes in the situation. [E-I c) 10)]
- Agree with ATC on the flight level, reporting points, entry/exit points and turn direction that best suit the threat. [E-I b)]
- Keep time on the ground short and adjust the time of operations (day/night) where this reduces exposure. [E-I c) 8)9)]
- Agree with ATC, the aerodrome or local airport security how information will be passed on at short notice; follow ATC/ATS instructions in unforeseen situations. [E-I c) 6)7)]
- Plan alternative routes around the risk area and landing sites outside the developing conflict zone; avoid diverting into a hazard area. [E-I d) e)]
- Consider ACARS or other data-link for passing diversion planning information to the aircraft. [E-I e) 1)]
- Climb and descend promptly to leave the risk area quickly, at speeds that minimise time at vulnerable altitudes. [E-I c) 1)2)]
- Expect GNSS jamming or spoofing: monitor navigation integrity, keep a non-GNSS navigation fallback and report interference to ATC. [E-I a)]

State authority (CAA)

- Maintain regular dialogue with operators before and after restrictions are imposed, and with neighbouring States and ANSPs. [E-III d) 3)5)6)]
- Use both proactive and reactive tools to inform users: notices, restrictions, prohibitions and aeronautical publications (NOTAM, AIC, AIP). [E-III d) 7)]
- Follow the NOTAMs and AICs issued by other States and share relevant threat information with the sector. [E-III d) 9)]
- Consider temporarily closing the affected airspace when the situation changes in ways not covered by the previous assessment or mitigation may be ineffective; this gives time for a full assessment. [Ch.5 5.2.4-5.2.5]
- Coordinate civil and military bodies on activity that may endanger civil aircraft (airspace coordination, hazard-area notification). [E-III b)]
- Take weapon range into account to select mitigation and to limit the airspace that must be restricted; assess capability, training and intent of the parties. [E-III c)]

Air navigation service provider

- Issue early and prompt notifications to airspace users; keep conflict-zone NOTAMs visible to controllers and supervisors and where they cannot be deleted by accident. [E-IV b) 1)5)6)]
- Plan, train and exercise ATC contingency procedures for threat-related incidents, including diversion scenarios. [E-IV b) 2)7)]
- Maintain civil-military coordination (e.g. letters of agreement) and procedures for diverting traffic around military areas. [E-IV b) 3)]
- Be able to distinguish civil from military aircraft and, in coordination with ATS, adjust altitude, reporting points, runway in use and entry/exit points to the threat. [E-IV a) 2), c)]

Based on the structure of the mitigation register in ICAO Doc 10084 (3rd ed., 2023), Appendix E; wording is SafeConflictZone's own summary. Precautionary principle: little evidence or a low probability of attack is not a reason to delay mitigation, because the consequence of a strike on a civil aircraft is catastrophic.

SAMPLE

10 Risk index matrix and conclusion form

Basis. Threat information was collected from the sources listed at the end of this report and analysed by cycle: collect information, analyse the threat, assess aviation security risk, identify hazards, assess flight-safety risk, apply mitigation, review (ICAO Doc 10084 risk-assessment cycle). Confidence in this country picture: **87%**.

Proposed risk index before mitigation: 5A (probability 5 frequent, severity A catastrophic) - **INTOLERABLE**. Driver: country level: ARI level high, active state prohibition / strong recommendation (L3). 5 of 12 hazard types are rated; types without data are not rated, which is not the same as low risk.

Before mitigation
index **5A** · **INTOLERABLE**

	A	B	C	D	E
5 Frequent	**5A**	5B	5C	5D	5E
4 Occasional	4A	4B	4C	4D	4E
3 Remote	3A	3B	3C	3D	3E
2 Improbable	2A	2B	2C	2D	2E
1 Ext. improb.	1A	1B	1C	1D	1E

After mitigation (proposed)
index **4A** · **INTOLERABLE**

	A	B	C	D	E
5 Frequent	5A	5B	5C	5D	5E
4 Occasional	**4A**	4B	4C	4D	4E
3 Remote	3A	3B	3C	3D	3E
2 Improbable	2A	2B	2C	2D	2E
1 Ext. improb.	1A	1B	1C	1D	1E

Left: the index as it stands, 5A (intolerable). Right: the indicative index once the measures below are applied in full, 4A (intolerable): the measures lower the probability of an encounter; the consequence of a hit on a civil aircraft stays the same. Red = intolerable, yellow = tolerable with mitigation, green = acceptable. Boxed cell = the index; shaded cells on the left = other rated hazards. Both indices are proposals by fixed rules: the responsible person confirms or changes them.

Measures that bring the index down (full register in the previous section):

- Check current NOTAMs, AIPs and regulator bulletins on the planned route, destination and alternates before every flight. [Operator / flight planning]
- Follow instructions of the authorities of the State of the operator and of the State managing the airspace; ask them when in doubt. [Operator / flight planning]
- Take note of all applicable NOTAMs and other aeronautical publications for the planned route during flight preparation. [Flight crew and flight operations]
- Carry extra fuel to be ready for changes in the situation. [Flight crew and flight operations]
- Maintain regular dialogue with operators before and after restrictions are imposed, and with neighbouring States and ANSPs. [State authority (CAA)]
- Use both proactive and reactive tools to inform users: notices, restrictions, prohibitions and aeronautical publications (NOTAM, AIC, AIP). [State authority (CAA)]

State warnings: **3** active; highest measure level determinable: **L3 prohibition / strong rec.**; not determinable from text: 0. Service risk level: **Intolerable**.

Item	To be completed by the responsible person
Measure level adopted (L1 / L2 / L3) and wording	
Risk index adopted (confirm or change the proposal above) and acceptability	
Mitigation applied (see the reference register above)	
Residual index after mitigation: confirm or change the proposal, and acceptability	
Decision, review date, name and signature	

The service is informational. Whether to close, avoid or operate through airspace is decided by the responsible person or the regulator; the matrix index and acceptability are determined by the operator's own safety-risk methodology.

11 Sources and limitations

This report draws on public information: official aviation-authority publications (NOTAMs, aeronautical information circulars, safety bulletins and conflict-zone advisories of regulators), open conflict-event and military reference data, open flight-tracking data and open media monitoring. Each country's evidence is processed by fixed rules into the level, the index and the recommendations above; the confidence figure shows how much data stands behind them. The list of individual sources and the method are available to customers on request.

Coverage differs by country and some information may be missing or delayed. Report generated 2026-11-24 19:13 UTC. Index values marked DEMO are illustrative, not real assessments.

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